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Can Autonomous Vehicles Keep Their Cool? A Survey of Thermal Side-Channel and Perception Attacks — arXiv:2610.21034
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21034
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T10:19:16.046Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
6fb61ce46d994fbb06949becfc02c7c9e2302eb1e54c2aaf032e4360ebafdf35- Stable URL of this page
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Can Autonomous Vehicles Keep Their Cool? A Survey of Thermal Side-Channel and Perception Attacks — arXiv:2610.21034 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21034 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_27ea643bd6f5 (Metraipolis archive dc_27ea643bd6f5, sha256 6fb61ce46d994fbb06949becfc02c7c9e2302eb1e54c2aaf032e4360ebafdf35)
BibTeX
@misc{dc27ea643bd6f5,
title = {Can Autonomous Vehicles Keep Their Cool? A Survey of Thermal Side-Channel and Perception Attacks — arXiv:2610.21034},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21034},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_27ea643bd6f5; sha256 6fb61ce46d994fbb06949becfc02c7c9e2302eb1e54c2aaf032e4360ebafdf35},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21034. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) couple safety-critical perception to thermally constrained compute. Interfaces built for night perception and package thermal reliability were never engineered as confidentiality boundaries, and closing one such path leaves the other intact. Physical adversaries can spoof thermal infrared (IR) sensors used for night driving, while unprivileged software co-tenants can fingerprint perception workloads from thermal, dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS), and thermal event interrupt (TEI) telemetry required for package safety. These paths differ in mechanism and privilege; both exploit interfaces that AV stacks cannot disable without compromising Safety of the Intended Functionality (SOTIF). Classical microarchitectural and cyber-physical systems (CPS) surveys address cache timing, adversarial machine learning, and camera or LiDAR spoofing; no prior survey jointly frames physical thermal IR attacks and unprivileged silicon thermal telemetry as one residual-risk class. This survey systematizes thirteen representative works into thermal perception integrity, telemetry leakage, and model-information extraction, comparing them by privilege, timescale, co-tenancy, deployability, and AV relevance. We distinguish attack family from adversary class and map defenses to residual risk while thermal management remains operational. A commodity proxy supports the software co-tenant branch only; physical IR evidence comes from cited literature. We identify open problems in on-target automotive evaluation, fusion trust under IR spoofing, chiplet thermal coupling, capability-based telemetry, and standards-ready threat analysis, aiming to motivate co-design across sensors, operating systems, silicon, and automotive standards. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21034 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T08:47:32.592Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).