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Don't Trust the Super-App: A Case Study of Russia's Max — arXiv:2609.11814

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11814
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-16T05:45:07.248Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
0075fc7a5da742ef0c074b38b4eec6476850b4f7a38f1b2d02785751db3092f5
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_27d7ffc970a7

How to cite

Don't Trust the Super-App: A Case Study of Russia's Max — arXiv:2609.11814 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11814 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_27d7ffc970a7 (Metraipolis archive dc_27d7ffc970a7, sha256 0075fc7a5da742ef0c074b38b4eec6476850b4f7a38f1b2d02785751db3092f5)
BibTeX
@misc{dc27d7ffc970a7,
  title = {Don't Trust the Super-App: A Case Study of Russia's Max — arXiv:2609.11814},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11814},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_27d7ffc970a7; sha256 0075fc7a5da742ef0c074b38b4eec6476850b4f7a38f1b2d02785751db3092f5},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11814. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Super-apps, an emerging mobile architecture, host third-party mini-apps inside a single app, allowing users to access diverse services. A decade of security research on the super-app ecosystem has all assumed super-apps to be a trusted intermediary. We argue this implicit trust is difficult to justify: China's WeChat is already shown to passively track its user's activity across mini-apps at extraordinary scale; Russia's MAX's parent company is reported to be deeply entangled with the state prosecution of online speech; and Iran's Bale was reported to be functioning in the world's longest internet shutdown due to its state-backed support. In this paper, we show how malicious super-apps have undeniable capabilities to silently undermine the security and privacy of mini-apps and users without leaving any trace. Using MAX as an example, we show how it can capture mini-app UI, read and write mini-app local storage, inject arbitrary JavaScript into a mini-app's runtime, mediate mini-app network traffic, and control authentication context in ways that can enable silent user impersonation. Sadly, these capabilities manifest themselves in any super-app because of the architectural privileges granted to them by design. We argue that mobile OS and app store interventions are urgently needed to close this architectural blind spot before it is further exploited.

Tema degli esploratori: governance digitale e beni comuni (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-11 in cs.CY).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Computers and Society (cs.CY).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11814 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T05:29:23.838Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CY/2026-09-11?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).