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Delegate Pricing to Algorithms: When Slow and Steady Wins the Race — arXiv:2610.11675

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11675
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-09T06:18:13.351Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
fac2c946f1815137c7259604e2794900c442dadefefae08b0a43d8ab1deb6522
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_278494a47efa

How to cite

Delegate Pricing to Algorithms: When Slow and Steady Wins the Race — arXiv:2610.11675 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11675 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_278494a47efa (Metraipolis archive dc_278494a47efa, sha256 fac2c946f1815137c7259604e2794900c442dadefefae08b0a43d8ab1deb6522)
BibTeX
@misc{dc278494a47efa,
  title = {Delegate Pricing to Algorithms: When Slow and Steady Wins the Race — arXiv:2610.11675},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11675},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_278494a47efa; sha256 fac2c946f1815137c7259604e2794900c442dadefefae08b0a43d8ab1deb6522},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11675. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study the strategic design of learning algorithms in a canonical continuous-time pricing game. We introduce a meta-game in which firms select learning rates for a gradient dynamic, evaluating payoffs as the discounted sum of profits accrued along the entire learning path. We uncover a fundamental dichotomy driven by stage-game incentives: if the stage game exhibits strategic substitutability, firms unambiguously prefer the fastest possible algorithms to rapidly exploit a gradually adjusting opponent. Under strategic complementarity, however, an excessively fast algorithm accelerates the rival's competitive response, destroying transitional profit margins. Even though the competitive price is a strictly dominant action in the underlying stage game, we prove that firms optimally design sluggish algorithms, extracting surplus during a prolonged convergence to the competitive equilibrium.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11675 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-09T05:49:00.709Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).