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Attacking P2P Networks: Liveness Attacks on the GossipSub and DOG Gossip Protocols — arXiv:2611.03509

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03509
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T18:33:14.542Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
7e93f97556bf6850c64984624003b6cef37c8e0fb9ea44c58292136bf8a54095
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_25c06d2aa355

How to cite

Attacking P2P Networks: Liveness Attacks on the GossipSub and DOG Gossip Protocols — arXiv:2611.03509 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03509 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_25c06d2aa355 (Metraipolis archive dc_25c06d2aa355, sha256 7e93f97556bf6850c64984624003b6cef37c8e0fb9ea44c58292136bf8a54095)
BibTeX
@misc{dc25c06d2aa355,
  title = {Attacking P2P Networks: Liveness Attacks on the GossipSub and DOG Gossip Protocols — arXiv:2611.03509},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03509},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_25c06d2aa355; sha256 7e93f97556bf6850c64984624003b6cef37c8e0fb9ea44c58292136bf8a54095},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03509. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks form the communication layer of large decentralized systems such as Ethereum, and the correctness of higher-level protocols depends on the gossip layer delivering messages to honest nodes. We study the robustness of two gossip protocols against adversaries whose only goal is to violate liveness, that is, to prevent honest nodes from receiving fresh messages, without forging, altering, or invalidating any message. For GossipSub, the publish-subscribe protocol used by Ethereum, we show that an adversary operating a constant number of geographically distributed nodes with a fixed latency advantage can take over the ``First Message Deliveries'' peer-scoring term and separate a constant fraction of nodes from the honest mesh. We analyze the attack under a geographical model, address the random-peer and outbound-connection mechanisms, and show that the separation can be maintained under realistic churn. For DOG, a transaction-dissemination protocol designed for CometBFT, we first give simple counterexamples in which route filtering disconnects the dissemination graph even without failures or Byzantine participants, and then present a practical attack that uses only a single physical node with a constant number of identities and legitimate actions to disable every forwarding route, separating the full network while allowing only direct publisher-to-neighbor delivery. We verify the attack in a simulated network and analyze its cost, assumptions, and possible mitigations.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03509 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T18:12:23.815Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).