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Efficient and Implementation-Hardened RBLWE on Commodity Cortex-M Microcontrollers — arXiv:2610.07820

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07820
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-07T11:25:45.234Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
1fb08306a9c5e301a950427522e0bfaf329d339d2c967e296f118e29812b8cf6
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_24dd9ff2da05

How to cite

Efficient and Implementation-Hardened RBLWE on Commodity Cortex-M Microcontrollers — arXiv:2610.07820 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07820 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_24dd9ff2da05 (Metraipolis archive dc_24dd9ff2da05, sha256 1fb08306a9c5e301a950427522e0bfaf329d339d2c967e296f118e29812b8cf6)
BibTeX
@misc{dc24dd9ff2da05,
  title = {Efficient and Implementation-Hardened RBLWE on Commodity Cortex-M Microcontrollers — arXiv:2610.07820},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07820},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_24dd9ff2da05; sha256 1fb08306a9c5e301a950427522e0bfaf329d339d2c967e296f118e29812b8cf6},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07820. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Efficient post-quantum cryptography on resource-constrained Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices requires implementations that exploit the target processor architecture while resisting practical implementation attacks. This paper presents an ISA-accelerated and implementation-hardened realization of Ring Binary Learning with Errors (RBLWE) encryption on a commodity ARM Cortex-M33 microcontroller. Packing four 8-bit polynomial coefficients into the byte lanes of a 32-bit register and processing them with SIMD-style instructions, together with a packed message codec, accelerates encryption and decryption, while a buffered hardware-TRNG entropy source drawn from the on-die Secure Element drives the key-generation gain. Together these give same-core cold-start speedups of $4.06\times$, $3.35\times$, and $3.01\times$ for key generation, encryption, and decryption over a scalar baseline, and $3.52\times$/$3.18\times$ lower encryption/decryption cycle counts than a reference Cortex-M0 implementation. On top of this accelerated core, we add four staged countermeasures: constant-time execution, fault hardening against zeroing, random-corruption, and instruction-skip faults, a Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO)-style CCA2 transform, and first-order shared (masked) CPA decryption, reporting each layer's cost individually. Binary-level inspection confirms these countermeasures survive compilation and identifies a compiler-induced masking flaw resolved with a hand-written assembly replacement. Dudect-style timing tests, debugger-assisted fault-injection campaigns, and component-level TVLA then provide implementation-level evidence for the staged protections. The results demonstrate a practical acceleration-security tradeoff for RBLWE on off-the-shelf microcontrollers and reusable architecture-aware techniques for lightweight post-quantum implementations.

Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (elenco arXiv cs.AR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Hardware Architecture (cs.AR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07820 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-07T11:16:09.470Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.AR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).