Metraipolis › archive › dc_238e02ee8701
The Market for AI-Assisted Signaling — arXiv:2611.02910
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02910
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-03T11:54:41.054Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
b30c3b1725c3b60d52f611d160d4e3a41562171ab60b42175fffae96d4d03c1b- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_238e02ee8701
How to cite
The Market for AI-Assisted Signaling — arXiv:2611.02910 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02910 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_238e02ee8701 (Metraipolis archive dc_238e02ee8701, sha256 b30c3b1725c3b60d52f611d160d4e3a41562171ab60b42175fffae96d4d03c1b)
BibTeX
@misc{dc238e02ee8701,
title = {The Market for AI-Assisted Signaling — arXiv:2611.02910},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02910},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_238e02ee8701; sha256 b30c3b1725c3b60d52f611d160d4e3a41562171ab60b42175fffae96d4d03c1b},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02910. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
This paper studies a market in which AI providers choose technologies and prices for assistance used to signal ability. Individual adoption is unobserved. Profitable assistance can lower welfare relative to signaling without AI, even when ability remains fully revealed. Easier imitation increases the output required to demonstrate ability, and the extra signaling can outweigh production savings. Providers can profit from improving assistance for lower-ability senders because this increases higher-ability senders' purchases. Such improvements can lower welfare relative to retaining existing tools. Competition among providers offering the same technology supports full information, but development costs can sustain monopoly provision that conceals ability. Greater verification capacity can also reduce information by changing which customers providers serve. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02910 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-03T11:15:07.659Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).