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Weather Data Spoofing Attacks on Rain-Adaptive Millimeter-Wave Frequency Selection in V2X Communication Networks — arXiv:2609.20601

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20601
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-10T04:00:07.803Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
0fff4466e3d68a32b32f35f0d9f9ea1389afc396a1eabda397c600da565cd54b
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_233f34254ae8

How to cite

Weather Data Spoofing Attacks on Rain-Adaptive Millimeter-Wave Frequency Selection in V2X Communication Networks — arXiv:2609.20601 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20601 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_233f34254ae8 (Metraipolis archive dc_233f34254ae8, sha256 0fff4466e3d68a32b32f35f0d9f9ea1389afc396a1eabda397c600da565cd54b)
BibTeX
@misc{dc233f34254ae8,
  title = {Weather Data Spoofing Attacks on Rain-Adaptive Millimeter-Wave Frequency Selection in V2X Communication Networks — arXiv:2609.20601},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20601},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_233f34254ae8; sha256 0fff4466e3d68a32b32f35f0d9f9ea1389afc396a1eabda397c600da565cd54b},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20601. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Connected vehicles use millimeter-wave (mmWave) sidelinks for the data rates cooperative driving demands, and emerging designs select the carrier band from sensed rainfall. We show that this weather awareness is an attack surface: an adversary who spoofs only the rainfall input dictates the victim's carrier frequency, and through it its communication range, without transmitting on the channel. We evaluate the attack in MilliCar, an ns-3 module that runs the selected band as the real 3GPP NR V2X carrier with per-band propagation, beamforming, and blockage. Forcing the band up to 73 GHz holds an eight-vehicle platoon's reliable range at 38 m while the honest baseline doubles it to 82 m; forcing it down to 5 GHz sustains 97% long-range reception but collapses the transport block to a third and quadruples long-range latency to 12.5 ms. We then implement the defense the mechanism implies. Rain loss grows linearly with distance while path loss grows logarithmically, so a receiver that tests measured SINR against the attenuation its reported weather predicts flags force-up with 98% probability within 1.5 s at a 1% false-alarm rate, and re-selection then restores long-range reception from 60% to 75%. The same test is structurally blind to force-down, because the 5 GHz fallback is nearly rain-immune. An advecting rain cell that swings the local rate from 15 to 81 mm/h leaves every result unchanged. Weather-aware band selection therefore requires an authenticated meteorological input; physical cross-checking covers one half of the threat.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-18 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Systems and Control (eess.SY).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20601 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-10T03:26:20.891Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-18?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).