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Structural versus Allocative Inefficiency Across Organizational Settings — arXiv:2609.23744
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23744
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-09T06:59:12.503Z
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Structural versus Allocative Inefficiency Across Organizational Settings — arXiv:2609.23744 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23744 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_215b0ef0cf77 (Metraipolis archive dc_215b0ef0cf77, sha256 ad9f4e7557dc93d755e6ec22901f67163c4c5848c0df9aebd24ed55d86cc39be)
BibTeX
@misc{dc215b0ef0cf77,
title = {Structural versus Allocative Inefficiency Across Organizational Settings — arXiv:2609.23744},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23744},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_215b0ef0cf77; sha256 ad9f4e7557dc93d755e6ec22901f67163c4c5848c0df9aebd24ed55d86cc39be},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23744. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Organizations invest heavily in internal mechanisms such as incentive systems, governance structures, performance measurement, analytics, and repeated reorganizations. Yet realized performance gains are often weak or short-lived, particularly in large and mature organizations. Standard explanations emphasize allocative inefficiency arising from incentive misalignment, information problems, or bounded rationality. While relevant, these explanations struggle to account for environments in which effort is high, optimization capabilities are sophisticated, and aggregate performance remains far below apparent potential. This paper develops a theory of structural inefficiency inside organizations. The central mechanism is the presence of internal externalities: unpriced cross-effects of organizational mechanisms acting simultaneously on multiple performance objectives. When such effects are mixed in sign, organizational effort is partially canceled internally, creating a structural ceiling on realized performance. The paper introduces a simple representation of organizational primitives and key performance indicators and derives a realized-performance law in which internal conflict enters as a multiplicative discount factor. Under weak and realistic conditions, structural inefficiency dominates allocative inefficiency, explaining why optimization often fails before organizational coherence is restored. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-22 in econ.GN). Categorie arXiv: General Economics (econ.GN). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23744 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-09T06:52:42.695Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.GN/2026-09-22?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).