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Forming Alliances in the Fog of War: A General Lotto Perspective — arXiv:2610.00608

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.00608
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-06T14:08:05.743Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
26c9ef52eb76000d8be39b4059983aff6241a38650f708597854c2cfbda692ec
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_20271f698565

How to cite

Forming Alliances in the Fog of War: A General Lotto Perspective — arXiv:2610.00608 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.00608 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_20271f698565 (Metraipolis archive dc_20271f698565, sha256 26c9ef52eb76000d8be39b4059983aff6241a38650f708597854c2cfbda692ec)
BibTeX
@misc{dc20271f698565,
  title = {Forming Alliances in the Fog of War: A General Lotto Perspective — arXiv:2610.00608},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.00608},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_20271f698565; sha256 26c9ef52eb76000d8be39b4059983aff6241a38650f708597854c2cfbda692ec},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.00608. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Agents competing against a common opponent can often gain an edge by forming alliances, but deciding whether to do so is difficult when they lack precise knowledge about their opponent or ally. We study how uncertainty affects opportunities for alliance formation in the coalitional General Lotto game, in which two players compete aganist a shared adversary by allocating their resource budgets over separate sets of valued contests. When all agents know one another's budgets, it is known that a budget transfer from one player to the other can benefit both players. We ask whether such alliances survive when the players know the relevant budgets only up to a multiplicative factor. Under two models, one in which the players are uncertain about the adversary's budget and one in which they are uncertain about each other's budgets, we characterize exactly which games admit a transfer that benefits both players in every game consistent with what they conjecture to be possible. In both models, we show that such robust transfers exist in a set of games of positive measure for every level of uncertainty. These results suggest that alliances can remain worthwhile even when allies are largely in the dark.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-10-02 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.00608 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-06T12:27:12.828Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-10-02?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).