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Benchmarking Post-Quantum Cryptography in Lightweight Virtualization Environments on Embedded Hardware — arXiv:2609.23902
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23902
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-09T07:01:05.856Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
fec1b9cfbd8e6e9cf7c52b094f94db037f20cf03f66490daafe73f0fba1ea287- Stable URL of this page
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How to cite
Benchmarking Post-Quantum Cryptography in Lightweight Virtualization Environments on Embedded Hardware — arXiv:2609.23902 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23902 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_1ec52aa67dc2 (Metraipolis archive dc_1ec52aa67dc2, sha256 fec1b9cfbd8e6e9cf7c52b094f94db037f20cf03f66490daafe73f0fba1ea287)
BibTeX
@misc{dc1ec52aa67dc2,
title = {Benchmarking Post-Quantum Cryptography in Lightweight Virtualization Environments on Embedded Hardware — arXiv:2609.23902},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23902},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_1ec52aa67dc2; sha256 fec1b9cfbd8e6e9cf7c52b094f94db037f20cf03f66490daafe73f0fba1ea287},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23902. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is being deployed while embedded systems increasingly adopt lightweight virtualization for workload isolation and security. Both trends change performance characteristics, yet their interaction is not well understood. To address this, we present a measurement study of PQC primitives on embedded-class ARM hardware under three execution environments with a shared software stack: native execution, a Docker container, and a Unikraft unikernel running under QEMU. We benchmark five signature and five key encapsulation mechanism families, and, for comparison, two classical algorithms each. We evaluate them using different parameter sets for a total of around 70 configurations, measuring execution time, memory, and energy per operation. To better gauge the impact on applications, we evaluated TLS 1.3 cipher combinations. We find that container overhead is negligible for primitive computation, whereas unikernel overhead depends on the algorithm. For most PQC families the overhead is negligible. A moderate overhead (1.28-1.53) arises in BIKE, HQC, and MAYO, and, above all, in Falcon signing (17.8-19.2). Per-operation energy closely tracks execution time in all environments. For TLS handshakes, container and unikernel clients need more time and energy per handshake, while all three environments converge once expensive post-quantum algorithms dominate the handshake. In these cases algorithm choice affects per-handshake energy by up to three orders of magnitude, far outweighing the environment. Overall, virtualization cost is inversely related to cryptographic cost: environment choice matters most for computationally cheap, standardized algorithms, while for expensive schemes, algorithm choice alone dominates performance. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-22 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.23902 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-09T06:56:00.988Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-22?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).