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Closing the Applied Cybersecurity Gap in Critical Infrastructure: A Cyber-to-Physical Security Assessment Framework for Water Systems — arXiv:2610.41050
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41050
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-03T05:39:46.168Z
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Closing the Applied Cybersecurity Gap in Critical Infrastructure: A Cyber-to-Physical Security Assessment Framework for Water Systems — arXiv:2610.41050 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41050 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_1c44f5eaefce (Metraipolis archive dc_1c44f5eaefce, sha256 6ea9a0d474c306e4839658423da96f17a59b5d6ac1d04e41cab7556fcdbbc22b)
BibTeX
@misc{dc1c44f5eaefce,
title = {Closing the Applied Cybersecurity Gap in Critical Infrastructure: A Cyber-to-Physical Security Assessment Framework for Water Systems — arXiv:2610.41050},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41050},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_1c44f5eaefce; sha256 6ea9a0d474c306e4839658423da96f17a59b5d6ac1d04e41cab7556fcdbbc22b},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41050. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
The integration of information technology and operational technology in water infrastructure creates pathways through which cyber compromise may affect physical service delivery. This study revisits the Applied Cybersecurity Gap (ACG) framework by evaluating an experimental Applied Cybersecurity Gap Index (ACGI) alongside the Cyber-to-Physical Propagation Rate (CPPR), defined as the proportion of initially compromised trials that produce a specified physical-impact outcome. The expanded evaluation comprises 2,160 synthetic trials across three water-network benchmarks, including EPANET Example Network 3 (Net3), and couples declared cyber-attack progression rules with hydraulic simulations. A source-trained machine-learning model evaluated on 247 compromised Net3 trials achieved ROC-AUC 0.772, PR-AUC 0.775, and F1 0.733, compared with 0.661, 0.642, and 0.704 for a scenario-only baseline. The configuration-cluster bootstrap interval for the ROC-AUC difference was 0.038--0.183. A separate 720-run Net3 hydraulic operating-point sensitivity analysis achieved the study's exploratory baseline pressure criterion in all reruns, preserved 717 of 720 physical-impact labels, and produced ROC-AUC 0.791 with the frozen source-trained model. Additional analyses examine the sensitivity of CPPR to the physical-impact threshold and assumed control-blocking probabilities, and demonstrate that the ACGI--CPPR association is partly induced by the simulation design rather than independently validated. The findings establish a reproducible simulation-based assessment workflow, but do not constitute field calibration of cybersecurity-control effectiveness or prediction of real-world utility incidents. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41050 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-03T05:23:42.973Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).