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Optimal Networks with Accumulative Costs and Bidirectional Communication — arXiv:2609.10546

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10546
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-16T05:45:10.650Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: 475d32ce6b4d332a9a32b9299f074e9a85058977f66da7cd9969d1a7f8f6d7f8
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How to cite

Optimal Networks with Accumulative Costs and Bidirectional Communication — arXiv:2609.10546 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10546 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_192ea25f1b05 (Metraipolis archive dc_192ea25f1b05, sha256 475d32ce6b4d332a9a32b9299f074e9a85058977f66da7cd9969d1a7f8f6d7f8)

BibTeX

@misc{dc192ea25f1b05,
  title = {Optimal Networks with Accumulative Costs and Bidirectional Communication — arXiv:2609.10546},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10546},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_192ea25f1b05; sha256 475d32ce6b4d332a9a32b9299f074e9a85058977f66da7cd9969d1a7f8f6d7f8},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10546. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

This paper is an extension of the approach of Larrosa and Tohmé (2003), in which the payoff function is modified by allowing information to flow in both directions. Costs continue to be paid by the agent who initiates the connection, so this asymmetry reveals changes in the final equilibrium topology. We find that several optimal topologies persist as Nash networks, but that a strict Nash network corresponds to the sequential line network with intermediate active nodes; that is, agents are placed in a line and, every other agent, they connect with the predecessor agent and with the subsequent agent. In this way, cost accumulation is interrupted and benefits are maximized.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-11 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10546 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T05:29:38.343Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-11?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).