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Cores of $3$-distant convex games — arXiv:2611.07572
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07572
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-06T14:43:41.519Z
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9ca5862d110d94584fb13da7f71c107d99b650809e580c105074e59cc36c09bd- Stable URL of this page
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Cores of $3$-distant convex games — arXiv:2611.07572 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07572 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_186ca86def61 (Metraipolis archive dc_186ca86def61, sha256 9ca5862d110d94584fb13da7f71c107d99b650809e580c105074e59cc36c09bd)
BibTeX
@misc{dc186ca86def61,
title = {Cores of $3$-distant convex games — arXiv:2611.07572},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07572},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_186ca86def61; sha256 9ca5862d110d94584fb13da7f71c107d99b650809e580c105074e59cc36c09bd},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07572. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Convex cooperative games have a nonempty core and admit an efficient construction of core allocations. However, economically natural local frictions may violate convexity. We study the core of $3$-distant convex games, which permit violations of convexity only between closely related coalitions. Although the core of such a game may be empty, we establish a simple necessary and sufficient condition for its nonemptiness. We also develop a strongly polynomial-time combinatorial algorithm for finding a core allocation whenever one exists. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of the framework to oligopolistic competition with merger synergies and profit allocation of joint production with complementary inputs. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07572 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-06T14:20:12.602Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).