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Veil-Then-Reveal: Protecting PII Privacy via Reversible Pseudo-Anonymization in Zero-Trust User--LLM Interaction — arXiv:2610.22800
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.22800
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-19T08:44:04.160Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
e0264267a8d774d1b505e00eb88309dffb98640832554f50e1cf5a44ec81e47a- Stable URL of this page
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How to cite
Veil-Then-Reveal: Protecting PII Privacy via Reversible Pseudo-Anonymization in Zero-Trust User--LLM Interaction — arXiv:2610.22800 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.22800 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_1839febebb5d (Metraipolis archive dc_1839febebb5d, sha256 e0264267a8d774d1b505e00eb88309dffb98640832554f50e1cf5a44ec81e47a)
BibTeX
@misc{dc1839febebb5d,
title = {Veil-Then-Reveal: Protecting PII Privacy via Reversible Pseudo-Anonymization in Zero-Trust User--LLM Interaction — arXiv:2610.22800},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.22800},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_1839febebb5d; sha256 e0264267a8d774d1b505e00eb88309dffb98640832554f50e1cf5a44ec81e47a},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.22800. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly process sensitive documents and personal information, yet sending prompts containing personally identifiable information (PII) to remote providers exposes data subjects and organizations to risks from logging, retention, model training, and unintended disclosure. Existing anonymization methods often mask or remove PII, while conventional encryption eliminates the lexical and structural cues needed for effective LLM processing. We present Veil-then-Reveal (VtR), a user-side PII pseudo-anonymization framework for privacy-preserving LLM interaction under a zero-trust threat model. VtR treats remote LLM providers as untrusted and sends only pseudo-anonymized prompts, keeping plaintext PII on the user. VtR first detects PII and replaces it with realistic, same-type, in-vocabulary surrogates before prompts leave the user's device, preserving their linguistic and structural properties. It combines format-preserving encryption (FPE) for structured PII, such as phone and credit-card numbers, with a keyed-hash dictionary and secure vault for semantic PII, such as names, locations, and organizations. Session-specific mappings provide cross-session unlinkability, while user-side restoration reversibly replaces surrogates with their original values in LLM responses. We further introduce a rank-class FPE strategy for dates that preserves format and ambiguity while reducing cipher evaluations. Evaluation on three datasets containing 11,322 annotated PII instances achieves 97.9% detection recall, 95.2% protection of detected values, and 99.9% round trip; 100% of echoed surrogates end-to-end round-trip restoration. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.CL, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Computation and Language (cs.CL). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.22800 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-19T08:39:24.898Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CL/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).