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Trembling toward Duverger: Convergence and Cycles in Synchronous Plurality Dynamics — arXiv:2610.23330

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.23330
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-19T08:44:34.626Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
ff27cc343bf09bae7354e18988b47ac239d2d2dfaabd97c9622c4af7f60ad4ef
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How to cite

Trembling toward Duverger: Convergence and Cycles in Synchronous Plurality Dynamics — arXiv:2610.23330 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.23330 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_181b5ac97023 (Metraipolis archive dc_181b5ac97023, sha256 ff27cc343bf09bae7354e18988b47ac239d2d2dfaabd97c9622c4af7f60ad4ef)
BibTeX
@misc{dc181b5ac97023,
  title = {Trembling toward Duverger: Convergence and Cycles in Synchronous Plurality Dynamics — arXiv:2610.23330},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.23330},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_181b5ac97023; sha256 ff27cc343bf09bae7354e18988b47ac239d2d2dfaabd97c9622c4af7f60ad4ef},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.23330. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Duverger's law states that plurality elections tend to concentrate support on two candidates. Pivotal-voter models typically derive this from aggregate uncertainty about votes, so that two-candidate competition emerges in the limit of large electorates. We instead propose a model for a fixed, finite population. A poll reveals the current support counts, and each voter best responds under trembling-hand beliefs, assuming that every other voter may deviate with a small probability. Starting from truthful votes, we show that a single update typically suffices for the dynamics to converge to a stable profile in which every voter supports her preferred candidate among the two poll leaders. For any number of candidates and any full-support tremble belief, a four-vote lead of the runner-up over all lower candidates suffices; for three candidates, a lead of two suffices. As a consequence, under random preferences, Duverger's law emerges after one update with probability $1-\mathcal O(N^{-1/2})$. While these results may suggest that the dynamics always settle, convergence can fail. Mild period-two cycles already arise, with a few voters swapping ballots around an otherwise stable profile. We show that substantially richer behavior is possible, even with three candidates. Period-three cycles arise with six voters changing their ballots, and no such cycle can involve fewer than four. Cycles can also alternate the plurality winner. Moreover, larger electorates support ever longer cycles: for every odd $\ell\geq3$, truthful voting can lead to a cycle whose vote counts repeat every $\ell$ rounds and whose full ballot profile repeats every $2\ell$ rounds.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.23330 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-19T08:40:39.830Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).