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One Node, Two Roles: Simultaneous Contests for Validation and Attention in Rollups — arXiv:2610.12220

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12220
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-09T06:20:36.612Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
9f2a865926a2c4677205023092079cae6191e9a42b46b997c4bc7abf78d33535
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_16f1cc577c49

How to cite

One Node, Two Roles: Simultaneous Contests for Validation and Attention in Rollups — arXiv:2610.12220 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12220 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_16f1cc577c49 (Metraipolis archive dc_16f1cc577c49, sha256 9f2a865926a2c4677205023092079cae6191e9a42b46b997c4bc7abf78d33535)
BibTeX
@misc{dc16f1cc577c49,
  title = {One Node, Two Roles: Simultaneous Contests for Validation and Attention in Rollups — arXiv:2610.12220},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12220},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_16f1cc577c49; sha256 9f2a865926a2c4677205023092079cae6191e9a42b46b997c4bc7abf78d33535},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12220. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

An optimistic rollup is safe as long as at least one honest validator executes its state transition function (STF) and disputes any assertion that is inconsistent with the result of the execution. Allowing anyone to participate, however, does not give incentive to do so: as long as every assertion is correct, verifying assertion correctness goes unpaid. Attention mechanisms address this by paying nodes to execute the rollup's STF, regardless of whether they participate in the validation process. Since a single node operator can back many registered identities with a single execution, paying per identity does not buy execution diversity, that is, the number of operators that independently execute. In this work we provide a new modeling framework for this problem. We formalize the underlying cryptographic primitive as a new notion, arguments with registered provers, whose properties include a form of non-amortizability that, to our knowledge, has not been studied for modern succinct cryptographic proofs before. We design validation and attention reward mechanisms and analyze them as two coupled Tullock-like contests, in which an operator pays once for the required execution and then chooses how many identities to deploy in each role. We quantify the attainable range of execution diversities in equilibrium as a function of the marginal cost of deploying an extra attention identity. We use our framework as a lens through which we compare two attention mechanisms, TRACE (MARBLE 2026) and Proof of Diligence (AFT 2024). In particular, we show that as opposed to Proof of Diligence, in TRACE the marginal cost mentioned above can be adjusted to support a higher execution diversity. As a case study, we apply our results to Arbitrum One, a widely deployed optimistic rollup.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12220 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-09T05:50:00.986Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).