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On the Complexity of Mixed Equilibria in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors — arXiv:2610.07858

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07858
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-07T11:27:48.403Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
aaf0fdff505a07a3c210821799a4998885ef65ef8062b43d337967eb9c362666
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_16ce19681267

How to cite

On the Complexity of Mixed Equilibria in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors — arXiv:2610.07858 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07858 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_16ce19681267 (Metraipolis archive dc_16ce19681267, sha256 aaf0fdff505a07a3c210821799a4998885ef65ef8062b43d337967eb9c362666)
BibTeX
@misc{dc16ce19681267,
  title = {On the Complexity of Mixed Equilibria in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors — arXiv:2610.07858},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07858},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_16ce19681267; sha256 aaf0fdff505a07a3c210821799a4998885ef65ef8062b43d337967eb9c362666},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07858. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We show that computing an approximate mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a discrete first-price auction with correlated priors is PPAD-complete. The key intermediate step in our reduction is the PPAD-completeness of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium in a new normal-form game, the hypergraph discrete first-price auction, which may be of independent interest.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Computational Complexity (cs.CC).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07858 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-07T11:16:54.472Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).