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Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting with Candidate Qualities — arXiv:2609.08830

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.08830
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-16T13:32:15.011Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
ece940c134dd4d11b7281ed518d71041c1a4ce2a7b7aff5712ca03c0127bc36d
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_15007da764ee

How to cite

Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting with Candidate Qualities — arXiv:2609.08830 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.08830 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_15007da764ee (Metraipolis archive dc_15007da764ee, sha256 ece940c134dd4d11b7281ed518d71041c1a4ce2a7b7aff5712ca03c0127bc36d)
BibTeX
@misc{dc15007da764ee,
  title = {Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting with Candidate Qualities — arXiv:2609.08830},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.08830},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_15007da764ee; sha256 ece940c134dd4d11b7281ed518d71041c1a4ce2a7b7aff5712ca03c0127bc36d},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.08830. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We initiate the study of a new model of approval-based multiwinner voting in which each candidate carries an exogenous quality score, capturing, for instance, the reliability of the candidate or their relevance to the context of the selection. Quality scores break with the standard assumption of approval-based multiwinner voting that candidates are fully defined by the set of their supporters. We rethink what proportional representation means in the presence of quality scores. For this, we introduce a threshold-based and a value-based family of axioms, analyze their relationships, satisfiability, and computational complexity, and present rules that achieve the strongest jointly satisfiable combinations of our proportionality axioms. We then analyze the compatibility of proportionality with the natural goal of maximizing the summed quality of the selected candidates. While imposing standard proportionality notions can lead to an almost complete loss of quality, we show that under a new class of reciprocal axioms, which scale a group's entitlement by the quality of its commonly approved candidate(s), there always exist proportional committees retaining at least 3/4 of the optimal summed quality, and such committees can be computed by our voting rules at no additional computational cost.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-09 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.08830 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T13:06:09.189Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-09?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).