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The Stability of Data Exchange in Competitive Markets — arXiv:2611.01468

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01468
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T18:28:48.830Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
2e4e13d1ce89950c65f2325e0ccaf39230728039296a56cde097a08b3d1abc75
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_147802f4f247

How to cite

The Stability of Data Exchange in Competitive Markets — arXiv:2611.01468 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01468 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_147802f4f247 (Metraipolis archive dc_147802f4f247, sha256 2e4e13d1ce89950c65f2325e0ccaf39230728039296a56cde097a08b3d1abc75)
BibTeX
@misc{dc147802f4f247,
  title = {The Stability of Data Exchange in Competitive Markets — arXiv:2611.01468},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01468},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_147802f4f247; sha256 2e4e13d1ce89950c65f2325e0ccaf39230728039296a56cde097a08b3d1abc75},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01468. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study the stability of data exchange among competing firms. Unlike tangible goods, data is non-rival: sharing it does not deprive the giver of its use. On one hand, competing firms-- often operating as machine-learning-driven predictors that collect observations from a shared environment to solve similar tasks-- can improve their predictive accuracies from pooling data. On the other hand, they compete for market share, which may depend on their relative predictive performance. This raises the central question of this paper: can there be a stable data exchange in such competitive environments? We formalize this via a model of $n$ firms exchanging fractions of their datasets, with predictive performance feeding into market competition. We adopt core stability as our solution concept, accounting for externalities via worst-case responses by non-participating firms. Our main results reveal a sharp contrast driven by demand structure: (i) in fully rational markets, where customers flock entirely to the top-performing firm, a core-stable exchange always exists for any monotone continuous prediction functions; (ii) in partially rational markets with logit-style demand, core-stable exchanges may fail to exist-and even approximate cores can be empty. Our impossibility results suggest that internal profit-sharing within coalitions can restore stability in partially rational markets. We formalize this intuition by showing that when co-operating coalitions equally redistribute market-share revenues among members, a core-stable data exchange exists. Finally, we propose a natural exchange dynamic and demonstrate empirically that it converges to a core-stable data exchange in fully rational markets on simulated instances derived from real datasets.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01468 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T18:11:22.751Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).