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GhostLock: Learning-Assisted Blind GPS Signal Nullification Without Victim-Side Information — arXiv:2610.20831

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20831
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-16T10:19:13.625Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
32ca2f0264c410d552c2e2aefe5567f0f7625a9c3c6572686e2274817330311c
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_146adaf412ed

How to cite

GhostLock: Learning-Assisted Blind GPS Signal Nullification Without Victim-Side Information — arXiv:2610.20831 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20831 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_146adaf412ed (Metraipolis archive dc_146adaf412ed, sha256 32ca2f0264c410d552c2e2aefe5567f0f7625a9c3c6572686e2274817330311c)
BibTeX
@misc{dc146adaf412ed,
  title = {GhostLock: Learning-Assisted Blind GPS Signal Nullification Without Victim-Side Information — arXiv:2610.20831},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20831},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_146adaf412ed; sha256 32ca2f0264c410d552c2e2aefe5567f0f7625a9c3c6572686e2274817330311c},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20831. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

The Global Positioning System (GPS) provides critical positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services for numerous safety- and mission-critical applications, making it an attractive target for physical-layer attacks. While GPS spoofing and jamming have been extensively studied, GPS Signal Nullification (GSN)-a physical-layer attack that suppresses authentic satellite signals through destructive interference prior to acquisition-remains largely unexplored. Existing wireless signal nullification techniques target conventional communication systems and typically require victim-side information, such as channel estimates or synchronization parameters, making them impractical for GPS. Furthermore, many GPS spoofing defenses assume authentic satellite signals remain available as trusted references, an assumption invalidated by GSN. To address this gap, we present GhostLock, a learning-assisted blind GSN framework requiring only an approximate target location estimate. GhostLock integrates a Blind Adaptive Filter (BAF) with a deep learning-based synchronization module to generate and align an anti-signal using only the attacker's locally received GPS signal, eliminating the need for victim-side observations. We implement GhostLock on a real-time software-defined radio (SDR) platform using GPS-SDR-SIM and GNU Radio. Experimental results demonstrate successful suppression of GPS signal acquisition, establishing the feasibility of blind GSN and motivating new detection and mitigation techniques for this emerging GPS threat model.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.20831 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T08:47:32.580Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).