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Hierarchical Defense in Leader-Defender-Attacker Games: Nested Equilibria and Receding-Horizon Control — arXiv:2610.09428

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.09428
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-08T14:17:10.809Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
56aa7f46c94c2963bdb467f9de21515a048a5e54f4d909d2a2a36711103e4659
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_13735be40d6a

How to cite

Hierarchical Defense in Leader-Defender-Attacker Games: Nested Equilibria and Receding-Horizon Control — arXiv:2610.09428 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.09428 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_13735be40d6a (Metraipolis archive dc_13735be40d6a, sha256 56aa7f46c94c2963bdb467f9de21515a048a5e54f4d909d2a2a36711103e4659)
BibTeX
@misc{dc13735be40d6a,
  title = {Hierarchical Defense in Leader-Defender-Attacker Games: Nested Equilibria and Receding-Horizon Control — arXiv:2610.09428},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.09428},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_13735be40d6a; sha256 56aa7f46c94c2963bdb467f9de21515a048a5e54f4d909d2a2a36711103e4659},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.09428. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We formulate a discrete-time leader-defender-attacker game that combines hierarchical interaction within a protective group with competition against an external attacker. The leader seeks to reach a prescribed demand point while avoiding capture, whereas the defender seeks to intercept the attacker while remaining near the leader. To capture their distinct objectives and asymmetric interactions, we introduce a nested equilibrium concept combining a leader-defender Stackelberg relationship with a Nash-type best-response condition for the attacker. For linear dynamics and quadratic objectives, we derive affine response laws and a backward recursion, together with sufficient conditions for unique stagewise solutions. We further express arrival, capture, and interception conditions as quadratic inequalities in the initial joint state, characterizing winning regions under the resulting policy. A receding-horizon algorithm implements the computed control laws using updated state information. Numerical experiments over randomized initial configurations examine the influence of the prediction horizon and compare the proposed method with an independent-control baseline, illustrating differences in game outcomes and the agents' realized costs.

Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (elenco arXiv eess.SY, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Systems and Control (eess.SY).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.09428 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T13:28:30.547Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/eess.SY/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).