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Don't Let One Lie Survive A Hundred Truths: A Selective Bayesian Trust Estimator for Collaborative Perception — arXiv:2610.07875
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07875
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-07T11:35:11.212Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
d4f581b2794ae7bc32e274a3417785f6b4b593499c23a0ae559dee27781fff21- Stable URL of this page
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How to cite
Don't Let One Lie Survive A Hundred Truths: A Selective Bayesian Trust Estimator for Collaborative Perception — arXiv:2610.07875 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07875 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_13417bbd280b (Metraipolis archive dc_13417bbd280b, sha256 d4f581b2794ae7bc32e274a3417785f6b4b593499c23a0ae559dee27781fff21)
BibTeX
@misc{dc13417bbd280b,
title = {Don't Let One Lie Survive A Hundred Truths: A Selective Bayesian Trust Estimator for Collaborative Perception — arXiv:2610.07875},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07875},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_13417bbd280b; sha256 d4f581b2794ae7bc32e274a3417785f6b4b593499c23a0ae559dee27781fff21},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07875. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Collaborative perception (CP) enables connected vehicles to see beyond their own sensors but makes them dependent on messages they cannot independently verify. A compromised collaborator can surgically conceal a single safety-critical object or inject a non-existing one while correctly reporting many others. Existing Bayesian trust mechanisms pool agreement across objects, which, while effective against blatant untargeted attacks, either incurs high false-positive rates (FPR), or allows unrelated correct reports to dilute persistent attack evidence for stealthy single-object attackers. To address this problem, we propose SABER, a selective two-tier Bayesian trust estimator. The first tier maintains broad agent and object trust, preserving the ability to downweight benign but low-quality contributors. Cumulative-sum screening selects agent--object pairs with persistent omissions or unsupported reports for focused Bayesian assessment. The second tier checks these pairs against other agents' evidence and maintains a separate, reference-weighted Beta state for each. The lowest pair score constrains agent trust, preventing unrelated reports from diluting a targeted attack. We establish sufficient conditions for stronger attacker-side trust reductions with bounded additional benign false alarms at fixed thresholds. Compared with state-of-the-art CP defenses, SABER improves attack detection while reducing benign FPRs. On OPV2V, SABER improves defense ROC-AUC over MATE by up to 0.427 in late fusion and 0.337 in intermediate fusion. Against advanced intermediate-fusion data fabrication attacks, it increases detection rates over ROBOSAC and LUCIA by up to 96.40 and 67.07 percentage points, respectively, while reducing FPRs. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.07875 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-07T11:18:39.677Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).