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Trusted Hardware Acceleration for Malicious-Secure Function Secret Sharing — arXiv:2610.04818
- Source
- arXiv
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04818
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-06T05:29:48.625Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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How to cite
Trusted Hardware Acceleration for Malicious-Secure Function Secret Sharing — arXiv:2610.04818 — arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04818 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_118cdf3f27fd (Metraipolis archive dc_118cdf3f27fd, sha256 2fe91e8b93441ad3e7fb6f718212d0719c4013edbd8314baf5c20a775610399f)
BibTeX
@misc{dc118cdf3f27fd,
title = {Trusted Hardware Acceleration for Malicious-Secure Function Secret Sharing — arXiv:2610.04818},
howpublished = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04818},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_118cdf3f27fd; sha256 2fe91e8b93441ad3e7fb6f718212d0719c4013edbd8314baf5c20a775610399f},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04818. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Function secret sharing (FSS) underlies two-party private inference and private information retrieval, with cost dominated by generating, moving and evaluating distributed point function (DPF) keys. A trusted GPU-integrated distributed function accelerator (DFA) removed key movement by generating and consuming keys locally, but tolerates only semi-honest adversaries. A malicious host or GPU can tamper with shares, replay one-time material, swap buffers after checking, request early outputs, or abuse the accelerator as a forgery oracle, while malicious FSS ships large authenticated keys or multiplies DPF work. We present VIGOR-DFA, protecting the chain from authorized input to authorized output release with three mechanisms: a fresh authentication epilogue using three field multiplications per DPF output, 3.8-4.0 times faster per gate than per-lane DPF tag trees; a freeze-before-challenge check of every opening with t = 3 independent MAC lanes over F_{2^61-1}; and a role-bound one-time resource ledger with a release guard, in a protected datapath beside the GPU L2 cache. We prove stand-alone static malicious security with abort in a protected-module model, with statistical error Q(2/p)^t approximately 2^-148 for Q less than or equal to 2^32 checked batches. Our DFA-calibrated model shows that, against dealer-based malicious FSS modeled after the protocol family of Shark, VIGOR-DFA removes 21.8-563 GB of per-query offline authenticated material and, mainly by generating it in-module, lowers LAN latency by 10.1-14.0 times (1.5-1.8 times excluding offline distribution) and energy by 3.0-3.9 times. Malicious security costs 2.5-3.5 times LAN latency over semi-honest DFA and 0.145 mm^2 at 7 nm. We have completed the verification of specifications and the functional CPU reference model, including GPU/RTL conformance verification, protected runtime evaluation, and deployment-related tests.
Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.04818 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-06T05:26:35.344Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).