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Fair Allocation with Optional Selling — arXiv:2608.24600

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24600
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-18T07:34:49.439Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
f0eb83b8334a5d842b420eecf0ae81bf677755c5c684150136a8d66b58184626
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0ff44573c3e3

How to cite

Fair Allocation with Optional Selling — arXiv:2608.24600 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24600 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0ff44573c3e3 (Metraipolis archive dc_0ff44573c3e3, sha256 f0eb83b8334a5d842b420eecf0ae81bf677755c5c684150136a8d66b58184626)
BibTeX
@misc{dc0ff44573c3e3,
  title = {Fair Allocation with Optional Selling — arXiv:2608.24600},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24600},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0ff44573c3e3; sha256 f0eb83b8334a5d842b420eecf0ae81bf677755c5c684150136a8d66b58184626},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24600. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We consider fair allocation of indivisible goods in a setting in which agents have subjective valuation functions over the set of goods, and in addition, goods may be sold at given market prices. In this setting, a fair allocation involves {deciding which goods to sell, how to allocate the unsold goods, and how to divide the money received from the sold goods.} We adapt to this setting the definitions of share-based fairness notions, such as the maximin share (MMS) and the truncated proportional share (TPS), and comparison-based fairness notions such as EF1 and EFX (which we adapt to SEF1 and SEFX). We show the following results when the utility of each agent is additive both over goods and over money. With two agents, there are allocations that are simultaneously MMS and SEFX. With three agents, there are instances in which no allocation gives every agent more than $\frac{11}{12}$-MMS. With any number of agents, there are $\frac{2}{3}$-MMS allocations. There also are allocations that are simultaneously SEFX and $\frac{n}{2n-1}$-TPS. This latter ratio is best possible, even without the SEFX requirement.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-26 in econ.TH).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24600 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-18T07:30:50.340Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-08-26?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).