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Iterated Elimination of Dominated Mixed Strategies — arXiv:2611.05705

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.05705
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-11-05T18:20:25.514Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: afd4700af197a996ffbb78a17cc978d09dab68c1cff1603aebd9459c66f08331
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0eaecfb6adfc

How to cite

Iterated Elimination of Dominated Mixed Strategies — arXiv:2611.05705 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.05705 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0eaecfb6adfc (Metraipolis archive dc_0eaecfb6adfc, sha256 afd4700af197a996ffbb78a17cc978d09dab68c1cff1603aebd9459c66f08331)

BibTeX

@misc{dc0eaecfb6adfc,
  title = {Iterated Elimination of Dominated Mixed Strategies — arXiv:2611.05705},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.05705},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0eaecfb6adfc; sha256 afd4700af197a996ffbb78a17cc978d09dab68c1cff1603aebd9459c66f08331},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.05705. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

This note compares two iterated dominance procedures, one based on eliminating mixed strategies and one based on eliminating pure strategies. It shows that, in compact and continuous games, the mixed-strategy procedure can trail the pure-strategy procedure by at most one round: If the pure-strategy procedure terminates at round $M$, the mixed-strategy procedure terminates at either $M$ or $M+1$, and this bound is tight. It also provides two characterizations of the mixed-strategy procedure that are round-for-round equivalent to it and that require checking for improvements only against opponents' pure strategies.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.05705 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-05T18:14:18.996Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).