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Rule-Based Pricing Algorithms and Market Outcomes: An Experimental Study — arXiv:2609.26861

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26861
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-08T10:08:39.858Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
36973a74848d9d067acfae4f64e7b96bb749005b1482161d8c35ec2a21c664ad
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0e7aeee4ef69

How to cite

Rule-Based Pricing Algorithms and Market Outcomes: An Experimental Study — arXiv:2609.26861 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26861 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0e7aeee4ef69 (Metraipolis archive dc_0e7aeee4ef69, sha256 36973a74848d9d067acfae4f64e7b96bb749005b1482161d8c35ec2a21c664ad)
BibTeX
@misc{dc0e7aeee4ef69,
  title = {Rule-Based Pricing Algorithms and Market Outcomes: An Experimental Study — arXiv:2609.26861},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26861},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0e7aeee4ef69; sha256 36973a74848d9d067acfae4f64e7b96bb749005b1482161d8c35ec2a21c664ad},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26861. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Rule-based pricing tools are widespread in digital commerce, yet we know little about how their design shapes market outcomes. In a controlled market experiment, participants use dashboards to build pricing algorithms competing in a sequential Bertrand game over multiple periods. We vary design features commonly found in commercial repricing tools: warnings about price wars, pre-configured strategies, and advice from a large language model. Most treatment variations raise market prices with effects driven by an increase in starting prices and more cooperative algorithm designs. The results matter for competition policy, platform regulation and current discussions on regulating algorithm design tools.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-24 in econ.GN).
Categorie arXiv: General Economics (econ.GN).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26861 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T09:17:59.697Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.GN/2026-09-24?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).