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Fair Feed Ranking for Participatory Budgeting — arXiv:2609.29819
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29819
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-08T04:52:01.042Z
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Fair Feed Ranking for Participatory Budgeting — arXiv:2609.29819 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29819 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0e5da4f5087f (Metraipolis archive dc_0e5da4f5087f, sha256 096636de0fade2bf9ac2c6a1823c167a48e3db0c91ea1b49612fecfda9c77abe)
BibTeX
@misc{dc0e5da4f5087f,
title = {Fair Feed Ranking for Participatory Budgeting — arXiv:2609.29819},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29819},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0e5da4f5087f; sha256 096636de0fade2bf9ac2c6a1823c167a48e3db0c91ea1b49612fecfda9c77abe},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29819. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
In large-scale participatory budgeting, citizens cannot inspect the full proposal pool, so the order in which proposals are shown becomes a form of agenda-setting power. We argue that fair exposure should therefore be treated as a democratic-design goal. We study Consul Democracy, a widely deployed open-source digital-democracy platform, and show that its proposal feeds are typically ordered by popularity, recency, or comment activity. Building on this diagnosis, we propose FairFeed, a feed-ranking design for PB that uses transparently declared preferences, boosts under-exposed proposals, and admits a rate-limited reject channel for crowd-sourced vetting. We evaluate the design in a simulation anchored in Munich's 2025 PB process and compare it with random, newest, and most-commented feeds. In this simulation, FairFeed broadens proposal discovery, distributes visibility more evenly across the eligible pool, increases cross-cutting support, and improves resistance to manipulation relative to comment-based ranking. We conclude by outlining the human-subjects evaluation needed to test whether onboarding can recover voter preferences accurately enough for deployment in practice. Tema degli esploratori: governance digitale e beni comuni (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-25 in cs.CY). Categorie arXiv: Computers and Society (cs.CY) ; Information Retrieval (cs.IR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29819 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-08T04:29:10.282Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CY/2026-09-25?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).