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When an effort-maximizing team architecture is unstable — arXiv:2610.38290

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38290
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-01T02:59:21.497Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
33ee65f30e75593d0cd4bfe7c2fb0294decf5abf11f3a871a4b8771d13246d20
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0dc77cb4dc04

How to cite

When an effort-maximizing team architecture is unstable — arXiv:2610.38290 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38290 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0dc77cb4dc04 (Metraipolis archive dc_0dc77cb4dc04, sha256 33ee65f30e75593d0cd4bfe7c2fb0294decf5abf11f3a871a4b8771d13246d20)
BibTeX
@misc{dc0dc77cb4dc04,
  title = {When an effort-maximizing team architecture is unstable — arXiv:2610.38290},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38290},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0dc77cb4dc04; sha256 33ee65f30e75593d0cd4bfe7c2fb0294decf5abf11f3a871a4b8771d13246d20},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38290. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Organizations choose team structures to intensify competition, yet their members may prefer to reorganize. We ask whether an architecture that maximizes aggregate effort can remain stable when contestants may form a replacement team from incumbent rosters. When a coalition draws from identical teams and reproduces their type, its members and the designer rank the reorganization in opposite directions: the coalition gains precisely when total effort falls. A strict effort optimum can therefore supply its own blocking certificate, while a stable optimum can survive only on a plateau where every reachable reorganization of this kind leaves effort unchanged. In a linear benchmark, we characterize stability against every feasible one-team reorganization and global effort maximization over every feasible partition. Except under pair capacity, the two regions do not overlap; with pair capacity, they meet only at one boundary. The ordering persists in a matched quadratic benchmark with strictly convex effort cost, and broader one-step deviation rights cannot restore overlap. Among standardized full-cap designs, the unique stable-effort optimum uses the largest feasible roster and sets incentive concentration at its blocking boundary.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38290 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-01T02:25:15.910Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).