Metraipolis › archive › dc_0d3b291eedae
An evolutionary origin of collective decision making in humans and machines — arXiv:2610.05676
- Source
- arXiv
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05676
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-06T05:32:20.793Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
09ff03626702561ea729377eceb6f511a8a5d07e0bb5d5da370f9276b11000f0- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0d3b291eedae
How to cite
An evolutionary origin of collective decision making in humans and machines — arXiv:2610.05676 — arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05676 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0d3b291eedae (Metraipolis archive dc_0d3b291eedae, sha256 09ff03626702561ea729377eceb6f511a8a5d07e0bb5d5da370f9276b11000f0)
BibTeX
@misc{dc0d3b291eedae,
title = {An evolutionary origin of collective decision making in humans and machines — arXiv:2610.05676},
howpublished = {arXiv},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05676},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0d3b291eedae; sha256 09ff03626702561ea729377eceb6f511a8a5d07e0bb5d5da370f9276b11000f0},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05676. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Groups of individuals can solve collective problems more accurately than any single member, by aggregating their opinions. Recent theoretical work has identified individual-level reward schemes that allow uninformed individuals to evolve collective intelligence from the bottom up, through social learning. Yet these results are restricted to linear prediction problems and simple averaging, while the decision tasks that real groups confront are often non-linear, and the institutions that aggregate opinions are seldom single-layer averages: districts elect representatives who in turn vote on policy, referees advise editors who decide on publication. Here we develop a framework for the evolution of collective intelligence in multi-layer voting populations, where individuals observe limited information and groups recursively aggregate their opinions by majority rule. We prove that single-layer voting cannot solve non-linear classification problems under any individual reward scheme. We then identify a "marginal feedback" payoff structure, which rewards individuals only when their opinion is pivotal in their group, and at every layer above them. This reward scheme induces a layered population to evolve accurate collective solutions to complex, non-linear decision tasks through individual-level peer imitation alone. The collective behavior that emerges is equivalent to a multi-layer perceptron in machine learning. Our results provide a naturalistic account of hierarchical institutions, in which the outsize importance of swing voters is the incentive that sustains collective accuracy; and they identify the credit-assignment rule in machine learning as not just an engineered solution but a natural evolutionary outcome. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.LG, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Physics and Society (physics.soc-ph) ; Machine Learning (cs.LG); Populations and Evolution (q-bio.PE). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05676 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-06T05:27:06.008Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.LG/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).