Metraipolis › archive › dc_0a60b79525fa
Bayesian Fair Division: Truthfulness in Picking Sequence with Correlated Valuations — arXiv:2608.07414
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.07414
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-19T09:50:10.905Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
ae46a15a7fd7c395196d7f85d92fdb4ad493274995fc7481e937b80cb3fc78b5- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0a60b79525fa
How to cite
Bayesian Fair Division: Truthfulness in Picking Sequence with Correlated Valuations — arXiv:2608.07414 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.07414 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0a60b79525fa (Metraipolis archive dc_0a60b79525fa, sha256 ae46a15a7fd7c395196d7f85d92fdb4ad493274995fc7481e937b80cb3fc78b5)
BibTeX
@misc{dc0a60b79525fa,
title = {Bayesian Fair Division: Truthfulness in Picking Sequence with Correlated Valuations — arXiv:2608.07414},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.07414},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0a60b79525fa; sha256 ae46a15a7fd7c395196d7f85d92fdb4ad493274995fc7481e937b80cb3fc78b5},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.07414. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Sequential allocation mechanisms contain a class of widely studied mechanisms (e.g., round-robin) in the fair division of indivisible goods, where agents take turns picking items in a predefined picking order. It is known that the sequential allocation mechanisms are not truthful: when an agent's most preferred item is not valued by others, the agent may manipulate the mechanism by choosing to defer picking that item and instead competing for another slightly less preferred item that is valued by others. Two underlying reasons are that each agent has perfect knowledge of the others' valuations, and each item's value to each agent can differ significantly. Will the mechanism be more truthful when each agent only has partial information about the others' valuations, which are known to be roughly consistent? This naturally motivates the study of the Bayesian fair division model. In this paper, we answer this question affirmatively for two agents. Under the Bayesian model, we precisely characterize the extent of this ``rough consistency'' that incentivizes agents' truth-telling. In particular, we show that for the case of two agents, when the valuations are positively correlated, truth-telling forms a Bayesian Nash equilibrium under the sequential allocation mechanisms. However, we show that truthfulness fails to extend to the setting with more than two agents. For more than two agents, we reveal a new type of manipulation that is different from the above-mentioned manipulation that defers a highly valued but less competitive item. Our result reveals a fundamental limitation on the truthfulness of sequential mechanisms. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-10 in cs.GT). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.07414 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-19T09:49:04.945Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-08-10?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).