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From Bilateral Trade to Matching Markets: Sharp Gains from Trade — arXiv:2609.30702

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.30702
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-08T02:07:57.817Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
4a37164ef99e3c99fd8226553c538efd71a9a068e8fa4418a44928299958a46e
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_08d519c0bb15

How to cite

From Bilateral Trade to Matching Markets: Sharp Gains from Trade — arXiv:2609.30702 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.30702 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_08d519c0bb15 (Metraipolis archive dc_08d519c0bb15, sha256 4a37164ef99e3c99fd8226553c538efd71a9a068e8fa4418a44928299958a46e)
BibTeX
@misc{dc08d519c0bb15,
  title = {From Bilateral Trade to Matching Markets: Sharp Gains from Trade — arXiv:2609.30702},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.30702},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_08d519c0bb15; sha256 4a37164ef99e3c99fd8226553c538efd71a9a068e8fa4418a44928299958a46e},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.30702. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study gains from trade in matching markets with independent private values and costs, Bayesian incentive compatibility, interim individual rationality, and no expected budget deficit. A second-best guarantee for finite bilateral trade extends without loss to matching markets with independent Borel priors, arbitrary downward-closed feasibility, and finite expected first-best gains. For bounded buyers with monotone hazard rates and arbitrary bounded sellers, we determine the exact worst-case ratio of second-best to first-best gains, approximately $0.72490721$. For binary buyers and sellers with at most $m$ types, we determine the exact ratio for every $m$, including $8/9$ when $m=2$ and a limit of $4/5$ as $m$ grows. Both families of bounds are tight already in bilateral trade.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-28 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.30702 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T01:41:24.861Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-28?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).