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Beyond the Trust Boundary: A Critical Reassessment of the FIDO2 Threat Model — arXiv:2609.03789

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03789
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-17T02:04:00.967Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
c472e8a53bf3b903f7d99094393a04c7da364b5225bc6e72c9a34e3dbdc24d73
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_083c3072e989

How to cite

Beyond the Trust Boundary: A Critical Reassessment of the FIDO2 Threat Model — arXiv:2609.03789 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03789 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_083c3072e989 (Metraipolis archive dc_083c3072e989, sha256 c472e8a53bf3b903f7d99094393a04c7da364b5225bc6e72c9a34e3dbdc24d73)
BibTeX
@misc{dc083c3072e989,
  title = {Beyond the Trust Boundary: A Critical Reassessment of the FIDO2 Threat Model — arXiv:2609.03789},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03789},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_083c3072e989; sha256 c472e8a53bf3b903f7d99094393a04c7da364b5225bc6e72c9a34e3dbdc24d73},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03789. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

FIDO2/WebAuthn has been widely deployed as a phishing-resistant authentication scheme. Because FIDO2 relies on public-key cryptography and hardware-backed authenticators, its security is often assumed to be guaranteed by design, provided that the cryptographic implementation is correct. In this work, we critically reassess the FIDO2 threat model and show that several commonly assumed security properties do not hold under realistic deployment conditions. We extend the threat model beyond the cryptographic layer to examine eight attack vectors across the FIDO2 stack: malicious browser extensions, platform-handler malware, passive sniffing, virtual device drivers, CTAP2-specific malware, USB/hardware implants, malicious USB hubs/docks/extenders, and NFC relay attacks. Our analysis shows that FIDO2 depends on environmental assumptions that may not hold in practice. We demonstrate how AAGUID and timing information can enable user profiling and targeted attacks, and how compromise of the browser, operating system, or hardware can undermine FIDO2 security even when the underlying cryptographic primitives remain uncompromised. We further show that attack chains spanning multiple layers can bypass the intended security guarantees of FIDO2. These findings indicate that the primary weakness in a FIDO2 deployment is often not the cryptographic layer, but the surrounding trusted environment. We also examine how these attack vectors can undermine device attestation by targeting the FIDO Metadata Service (MDS3), which serves as a root of trust for authenticator metadata. Finally, we characterize the attacks according to privilege, skill, and resource requirements. We conclude that effective FIDO2 security requires layered mitigations covering the browser, operating system, hardware, protocol stack, and metadata infrastructure.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-04 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Emerging Technologies (cs.ET).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03789 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T01:28:02.803Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-04?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).