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Solving the Arctic Product-Mix Auction — arXiv:2609.36346

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36346
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-07T17:25:50.260Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
e1add2e893d1a910ae55dbb9944cb45185b73a2367f912133820b5c558e49994
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_07e714bbc457

How to cite

Solving the Arctic Product-Mix Auction — arXiv:2609.36346 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36346 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_07e714bbc457 (Metraipolis archive dc_07e714bbc457, sha256 e1add2e893d1a910ae55dbb9944cb45185b73a2367f912133820b5c558e49994)
BibTeX
@misc{dc07e714bbc457,
  title = {Solving the Arctic Product-Mix Auction — arXiv:2609.36346},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36346},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_07e714bbc457; sha256 e1add2e893d1a910ae55dbb9944cb45185b73a2367f912133820b5c558e49994},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36346. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Arctic product-mix auctions allow budget-constrained bidders to express preferences over multiple substitute goods. We give the first strongly polynomial algorithm to find the competitive equilibria when the auctioneer has separable convex piecewise-linear costs. It combines a strongly polynomial reduction to the costless Arctic auction with an existing strongly polynomial algorithm for costless Arctic auctions. We also give a polynomial-time Turing reduction from costless Arctic auctions to linear Fisher markets, and a strongly polynomial many-to-one reduction to linear Arrow-Debreu exchange markets. If a good is sold in positive quantity in two competitive equilibria, its price is the same in both.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-30 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36346 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-07T16:57:11.427Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-30?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).