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Toward Practical Decentralized Proof-of-Location via Physical Witnessing Zones — arXiv:2608.04957

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04957
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-31T11:27:32.819Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
a6972c918958a85dae2793f6ce41f3d9297f76ec501d543899d1572a32adefa4
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_07de09d28470

How to cite

Toward Practical Decentralized Proof-of-Location via Physical Witnessing Zones — arXiv:2608.04957 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04957 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_07de09d28470 (Metraipolis archive dc_07de09d28470, sha256 a6972c918958a85dae2793f6ce41f3d9297f76ec501d543899d1572a32adefa4)
BibTeX
@misc{dc07de09d28470,
  title = {Toward Practical Decentralized Proof-of-Location via Physical Witnessing Zones — arXiv:2608.04957},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04957},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_07de09d28470; sha256 a6972c918958a85dae2793f6ce41f3d9297f76ec501d543899d1572a32adefa4},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04957. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Digital services increasingly rely on claims that a person, device, or asset was in a specific place at a specific time. Today, those claims often depend on self-reported location data, which is easy to falsify and difficult to verify after the fact. Proof-of-Location (PoL) systems address this gap by turning presence claims into evidence that an independent verifier can later inspect. This paper builds upon recent theoretical work on decentralized PoL architectures and demonstrates how they can move from emulation to a physical prototype built with low-cost hardware. We implement a witnessing zone in which fixed nearby devices measure a prover's presence, exchange claims over a local mesh, and record them in a tamper-evident ledger. Building the prototype required adapting the abstract protocol to physical constraints through witness-initiated ranging, cross-witness consistency checks, and freshness binding against replay. Our controlled indoor evaluation shows that the system can produce accurate, low-latency proof objects while detecting simulated replay and malicious-ranging attacks. The result is a reusable experimental baseline for next-generation digital trust infrastructure, that exposes the remaining calibration, verifier-independence, radio-integrity, and scaling requirements for decentralized location evidence, where physical presence claims can be independently checked under real radio, networking, and timing conditions.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-06 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04957 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-31T11:17:19.452Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-08-06?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).