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At What Cost? (In)efficiency in First-Price Procurement Auctions — arXiv:2611.03386

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03386
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T18:28:52.659Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
4ed219c64520069beeed44ae5ad891058f7c9df4553ea7790a43c4c84562bdb4
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How to cite

At What Cost? (In)efficiency in First-Price Procurement Auctions — arXiv:2611.03386 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03386 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_06be5a35fb67 (Metraipolis archive dc_06be5a35fb67, sha256 4ed219c64520069beeed44ae5ad891058f7c9df4553ea7790a43c4c84562bdb4)
BibTeX
@misc{dc06be5a35fb67,
  title = {At What Cost? (In)efficiency in First-Price Procurement Auctions — arXiv:2611.03386},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03386},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_06be5a35fb67; sha256 4ed219c64520069beeed44ae5ad891058f7c9df4553ea7790a43c4c84562bdb4},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03386. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study the efficiency of Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price procurement auctions. We measure efficiency by the Price of Anarchy (PoA): the ratio between the expected social cost in equilibrium and the minimum expected social cost resulting from a socially optimal allocation. We first show that the standard first-price procurement auction has no bounded PoA guarantee. We construct equilibria in which every bidder is indifferent between all bids in a common interval, so that bids can be arbitrarily large, and the PoA is unbounded. If costs lie in an interval $[\underline c,\bar c]$ but bids are not restricted, the PoA equals the trivial ratio $\bar c/\underline c$. We hence study ways to restore a finite guarantee, first by characterizing the PoA when bids lie in $[\underline c,\bar c]$, which leads to the tight bound $1 + \frac1{e^2}(\frac{\bar c}{\underline c}-1)$. Alternatively, we introduce the notion of a phantom bidder: the auctioneer accepts the lowest bid only if it does not exceed a phantom bid, drawn independently of the costs, and otherwise buys from an outside option at cost $\bar c$. We show that a simple fixed phantom bid, i.e., a deterministic cap, gives PoA $=\frac1e\sqrt {\frac{\bar c}{\underline c}}+O(1)$. We further show that no phantom mechanism whose construction depends only on the cost interval, under a mild regularity condition, whatever distribution it uses and whatever it reveals about the phantom bid before bidding, can improve on the $\sqrt{\frac{\bar c}{\underline c}}$ dependence.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03386 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T18:11:22.760Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).