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Robust Optimization in Stochastic Games — arXiv:2611.01151

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01151
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T18:45:16.762Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
e14ee73015c3f3bccce7f19c08d01dfacfce3e812657fe2b0ca357ff9e1ceadc
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_069aa7a331ef

How to cite

Robust Optimization in Stochastic Games — arXiv:2611.01151 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01151 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_069aa7a331ef (Metraipolis archive dc_069aa7a331ef, sha256 e14ee73015c3f3bccce7f19c08d01dfacfce3e812657fe2b0ca357ff9e1ceadc)
BibTeX
@misc{dc069aa7a331ef,
  title = {Robust Optimization in Stochastic Games — arXiv:2611.01151},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01151},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_069aa7a331ef; sha256 e14ee73015c3f3bccce7f19c08d01dfacfce3e812657fe2b0ca357ff9e1ceadc},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01151. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

A player's impatient valuation of an infinite stream of stage payoffs is a weighted average with nonincreasing weights. Such valuations generalize geometric discounting and allow imprecise or heterogeneous time preferences. For a stochastic game \(\Gamma\) and a profile \(u\) of impatient valuations, let \(\Gamma_u\) be the induced game. We ask when approximately optimal or equilibrium behavior can be chosen to vary continuously and stably with \(u\). We show that this robustness is governed by the corresponding uniform long-run payoff property: the uniform value in the adversary case, and uniform approximate equilibrium payoffs in the equilibrium case. In finite state spaces, the latter is equivalent to the usual existence of a uniform equilibrium payoff. In the two-player zero-sum case, if \(\Gamma\) has a uniform value, then the value of \(\Gamma_u\) varies uniformly continuously with \(u\), and for every \(\varepsilon>0\) there is a uniformly continuous mapping assigning to each \(u\) an \(\varepsilon\)-optimal strategy in \(\Gamma_u\). Hence this holds for every finite two-player zero-sum stochastic game. In the non-zero-sum case, uniform approximate equilibrium payoffs imply a finite cover of the valuation-profile space by neighborhoods on each of which a single strategy profile is a robust \(\varepsilon\)-equilibrium. For sunspot, correlated, and extensive-form correlated equilibria, uniform approximate equilibrium payoffs are equivalent to the existence, for every \(\varepsilon>0\), of a uniformly continuous mapping assigning to each valuation profile a robust \(\varepsilon\)-equilibrium on a neighborhood of that profile. Consequently, every finite stochastic game admits uniformly continuous robust extensive-form correlated \(\varepsilon\)-equilibrium selections.

Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (elenco arXiv math.OC, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Optimization and Control (math.OC).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01151 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T18:14:37.752Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/math.OC/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).