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Reputation and institutional certification as complementary trust mechanisms in a single online market — arXiv:2608.17312

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.17312
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-18T14:43:32.744Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
766ccc00b5caad14ed4caf0175da3443557f956308c34cbc7d52bd2a8e835f31
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_068dedebb190

How to cite

Reputation and institutional certification as complementary trust mechanisms in a single online market — arXiv:2608.17312 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.17312 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_068dedebb190 (Metraipolis archive dc_068dedebb190, sha256 766ccc00b5caad14ed4caf0175da3443557f956308c34cbc7d52bd2a8e835f31)
BibTeX
@misc{dc068dedebb190,
  title = {Reputation and institutional certification as complementary trust mechanisms in a single online market — arXiv:2608.17312},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.17312},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_068dedebb190; sha256 766ccc00b5caad14ed4caf0175da3443557f956308c34cbc7d52bd2a8e835f31},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.17312. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Reputation and institutional certification are the two main trust mechanisms under information asymmetry, yet their interaction remains poorly understood. Here we analyze nearly one million eBay listings of Pokemon trading cards. Each listing pairs the seller's reputation with their signal choice, that is, whether they used costly third-party certification, their own costless claim (self-grading), or neither to convey the card's quality. First, we find that certification and self-grading partition the market. Self-grading prevails where reputation is high and value low, whereas certification prevails in the market's opposite corner. Furthermore, seller reputation raises the price premium of self-grading but not of certification. We then show that both empirical patterns follow from a signaling model in which false self-grading damages reputation, whereas certification requires an up-front fee. These results suggest that, even within a single market, trust rests not on a choice between reputation and institutions but on a division of labor.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-19 in econ.GN).
Categorie arXiv: Physics and Society (physics.soc-ph) ; General Economics (econ.GN).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.17312 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-18T14:38:05.651Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.GN/2026-08-19?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).