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BlindStep: A Secure One-Step Kernel for Privacy-Preserving Collaborative Reasoning — arXiv:2610.41369

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41369
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-02T07:47:26.118Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
4c21763b1f787c930aa20a2b29a4e159c423eb958ad8ad440a068c495155aae6
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0656d29a2312

How to cite

BlindStep: A Secure One-Step Kernel for Privacy-Preserving Collaborative Reasoning — arXiv:2610.41369 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41369 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0656d29a2312 (Metraipolis archive dc_0656d29a2312, sha256 4c21763b1f787c930aa20a2b29a4e159c423eb958ad8ad440a068c495155aae6)
BibTeX
@misc{dc0656d29a2312,
  title = {BlindStep: A Secure One-Step Kernel for Privacy-Preserving Collaborative Reasoning — arXiv:2610.41369},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41369},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0656d29a2312; sha256 4c21763b1f787c930aa20a2b29a4e159c423eb958ad8ad440a068c495155aae6},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41369. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

A recurring step in two-party collaborative workflows combines a private candidate frontier with a partner's compatible evidence, scores the resulting candidates, and retains only a small frontier. Direct execution can expose intermediate candidates, local scores, or unauthorized evidence provenance. Existing MPC platforms and PSI protocols provide useful building blocks, but they do not define a unified post-alignment boundary for bounded-slot aggregation, fail-closed overflow handling, retained-frontier selection, and downstream disclosure. We present BlindStep, a fixed-shape MPC-online kernel for one such post-alignment step between two semi-honest parties. Given a frontend realizing the bounded-slot contract and an application enforcing the reveal policy $\rho$, BlindStep provides a per-invocation simulation-based guarantee in the $F_{\mathrm{align}}$-hybrid model: the kernel leaks only public setup parameters, fixed execution-shape metadata, a global overflow bit, and $\rho$-authorized Layer-2 disclosures. The guarantee excludes malicious security and multi-invocation composition, and treats frontend leakage and offline preprocessing separately. Within this kernel boundary, we implement six semi2k realizations in MP-SPDZ, crossing two sharing styles and three top-K strategies: H-variants compare over arithmetic shares, while B-variants convert packed ranking values to Boolean shares before selection. Under LAN, B-Queue is 6-7 times faster and uses about 40 times less communication than H-Queue at N = 256 and 2048. Against H-Sort on the same backend, B-Queue achieves speedups of 21 and 30 times and communication reductions of 204 and 290 times at N = 2048 and 8192, respectively. Under the evaluated N = 256, 100 ms RTT WAN profile, H-Sort becomes fastest, showing that round complexity can dominate backend choice for the measured MPC-online kernel.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41369 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-02T07:39:31.056Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).