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Classification Aggregation with Multiple Memberships — arXiv:2611.02984

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02984
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-11-03T10:39:46.823Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: 703166931f6dea6fada51d6158eb9e16f54a89547139456ee7cb6511bb15cf1e
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_04aef3ccff22

How to cite

Classification Aggregation with Multiple Memberships — arXiv:2611.02984 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02984 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_04aef3ccff22 (Metraipolis archive dc_04aef3ccff22, sha256 703166931f6dea6fada51d6158eb9e16f54a89547139456ee7cb6511bb15cf1e)

BibTeX

@misc{dc04aef3ccff22,
  title = {Classification Aggregation with Multiple Memberships — arXiv:2611.02984},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02984},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_04aef3ccff22; sha256 703166931f6dea6fada51d6158eb9e16f54a89547139456ee7cb6511bb15cf1e},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02984. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

People face the problem of classifying objects into categories while aggregating their opinions. We axiomatically study such a classification aggregation problem with multiple memberships, meaning that each individual assigns one category to every object, whereas the resulting classification may assign more than one category. Under the natural settings and axioms (i.e., Independence and Supportiveness), each of our new axioms -- Responsibility, Split Stability and Rejection Stability -- characterises what we call the junta rules. The rules assign a category to an object exactly when some member of a fixed coalition does so. The coalitions that can secure an assignment form a grill, a topological structure implied by an ultrafilter. Hence, the study parallels the literature on Arrow's theorem characterised by the decisive coalition structures. An infinite population setting is also investigated to clarify the differences among the axioms.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.MA, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02984 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T10:39:34.950Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.MA/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).