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Strategic Tanking in Stable Matching Markets — arXiv:2610.42105

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.42105
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T07:39:24.965Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
9e7504cc3d7136d53e4cd36267d734d57b88c2748c54ab3060178c01d23eafa4
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_047c4751fa3e

How to cite

Strategic Tanking in Stable Matching Markets — arXiv:2610.42105 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.42105 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_047c4751fa3e (Metraipolis archive dc_047c4751fa3e, sha256 9e7504cc3d7136d53e4cd36267d734d57b88c2748c54ab3060178c01d23eafa4)
BibTeX
@misc{dc047c4751fa3e,
  title = {Strategic Tanking in Stable Matching Markets — arXiv:2610.42105},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.42105},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_047c4751fa3e; sha256 9e7504cc3d7136d53e4cd36267d734d57b88c2748c54ab3060178c01d23eafa4},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.42105. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Motivated by a broad literature in psychology, organizational behavior, and matching markets, we introduce strategic tanking: an agent deliberately makes themselves less attractive to selected potential partners in order to improve their eventual assignment. Unlike traditional manipulation in stable matching, a tanker does not misreport whom they prefer; instead, they influence how others rank them. We show that tanking has a striking connection to classical preference manipulation. Cutoff tanking, in which an agent tanks with every potential partner below a chosen threshold, has exactly the same effect on the stable set as truncating one's own preference list at that threshold. Thus an agent can reproduce the power of a classical truncation while leaving their own preferences unchanged and every match acceptable. Arbitrary tanking, however, can go substantially further: under proposer-deferred acceptance, tanking equilibria can lie outside the sincere stable set. More broadly, whenever the sincere stable set contains multiple matchings, profitable strategic behavior remains available through either traditional preference manipulation or tanking, even when one side is restricted to honestly reporting their own preferences.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.MA, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Multiagent Systems (cs.MA).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.42105 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T07:39:22.220Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.MA/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).