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RARE: Response-Aware Rational Equilibrium in Pricing Games — arXiv:2610.38897

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38897
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-31T06:22:23.683Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: 809504856c582697808bdbe01efc2fe8fff1fdb22e2e374836fb816f25c1b5a8
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_03ea440efae4

How to cite

RARE: Response-Aware Rational Equilibrium in Pricing Games — arXiv:2610.38897 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38897 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_03ea440efae4 (Metraipolis archive dc_03ea440efae4, sha256 809504856c582697808bdbe01efc2fe8fff1fdb22e2e374836fb816f25c1b5a8)

BibTeX

@misc{dc03ea440efae4,
  title = {RARE: Response-Aware Rational Equilibrium in Pricing Games — arXiv:2610.38897},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38897},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_03ea440efae4; sha256 809504856c582697808bdbe01efc2fe8fff1fdb22e2e374836fb816f25c1b5a8},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38897. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study a pricing game in markets with budget-constrained buyers, where each seller offers a single good at a price she sets, and each buyer chooses a utility-maximizing bundle subject to her budget. We consider both the rivalrous setting, such as markets for physical goods, and the non-rivalrous setting, such as markets for datasets. Pure Nash equilibria often fail to exist in this game. However, Nash equilibrium assumes that the other sellers keep their prices fixed when one seller deviates, whereas in practice, sellers harmed by a price change may respond, for example, by matching the new price. We propose a new equilibrium notion called Response-Aware Rational Equilibrium (RARE). At a RARE, every deviation by a seller can be deterred by a response from the other sellers, in which no responder earns less than she did right after the deviation. Every Nash equilibrium is a RARE. Assuming that buyers' purchases (among their optimal choices) change continuously with prices, we show that a RARE always exists for rivalrous goods, and for non-rivalrous goods when buyers have equal budgets. Moreover, the RARE that we construct extracts the buyers' entire budget. For non-rivalrous goods with unequal budgets, we show that an approximate RARE exists, where a deviating seller can increase her revenue by a factor of at most $b_{\mathrm{avg}}/b_{\min}$, the ratio of the average budget to the minimum budget. Our proof uses two nested applications of the KKM lemma. We also study a natural dynamic in which sellers repeatedly raise their prices to earn the revenue that they could guarantee themselves by deviating, and show that it reaches an approximate RARE, with additive error $\delta$, within $\lfloor B/\delta \rfloor$ rounds, where $B$ is the buyers' total budget. The main results of this paper are formally verified in the Lean 4 proof assistant ( this https URL ).

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.38897 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-31T06:08:53.363Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).