Metraipolis › archive › dc_035f67d7554d
ROLoad-PMP: Securing Sensitive Operations for Kernels and Bare-Metal Firmware — arXiv:2608.13287
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13287
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-19T04:24:56.481Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
19fc539c2a2d69a16208d0a0be08a52ca56e7fea49b1e43577284ad70be7e22a- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_035f67d7554d
How to cite
ROLoad-PMP: Securing Sensitive Operations for Kernels and Bare-Metal Firmware — arXiv:2608.13287 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13287 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_035f67d7554d (Metraipolis archive dc_035f67d7554d, sha256 19fc539c2a2d69a16208d0a0be08a52ca56e7fea49b1e43577284ad70be7e22a)
BibTeX
@misc{dc035f67d7554d,
title = {ROLoad-PMP: Securing Sensitive Operations for Kernels and Bare-Metal Firmware — arXiv:2608.13287},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13287},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_035f67d7554d; sha256 19fc539c2a2d69a16208d0a0be08a52ca56e7fea49b1e43577284ad70be7e22a},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13287. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
A common way for attackers to compromise victim systems is hijacking sensitive operations (e.g., control-flow transfers) with attacker-controlled inputs. Existing solutions in general only protect parts of these targets and have high performance overheads, which are impractical and hard to deploy on systems with limited resources (e.g., IoT devices) or for low-level software like kernels and bare-metal firmware. In this paper, we present a lightweight hardware-software co-design solution ROLoad-PMP to protect sensitive operations from being hijacked for low-level software. First, we propose new instructions, which only load data from read-only memory regions with specific keys, to guarantee the integrity of pointees pointed by (potentially corrupted) data pointers. Then, we provide a program hardening mechanism to protect sensitive operations, by classifying and placing their operands into read-only memory with different keys at compile-time and loading them with ROLoad-PMP-family instructions at runtime. We have implemented an FPGA-based prototype of ROLoad-PMP based on RISC-V, and demonstrated an important defense application, i.e., forward-edge control-flow integrity. Results showed that ROLoad-PMP only costs few extra hardware resources (< 1.40%). Moreover, it enables many lightweight (e.g., with negligible overheads < 0.853%) defenses, and provides broader and stronger security guarantees than existing hardware solutions, e.g., ARM BTI and Intel CET. Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-14 in cs.AR). Categorie arXiv: Hardware Architecture (cs.AR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13287 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-19T04:18:14.567Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AR/2026-08-14?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).