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Mitigating Emergent Collusion in LLM Pricing Agents — arXiv:2609.13037
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13037
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T03:09:05.551Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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Mitigating Emergent Collusion in LLM Pricing Agents — arXiv:2609.13037 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13037 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_02f5ab87472b (Metraipolis archive dc_02f5ab87472b, sha256 169aefd7d20f142f913bb0b639b3875241382d589ae57e08ed93ffd69dd5285e)
BibTeX
@misc{dc02f5ab87472b,
title = {Mitigating Emergent Collusion in LLM Pricing Agents — arXiv:2609.13037},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13037},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_02f5ab87472b; sha256 169aefd7d20f142f913bb0b639b3875241382d589ae57e08ed93ffd69dd5285e},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13037. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Recent work shows that LLM-based pricing agents can produce supracompetitive outcomes in repeated oligopoly environments without being explicitly instructed to collude. We reproduce the qualitative prompt-sensitivity effect of Fish et al. using DeepSeek-V3.1: the P1 prompt produces significantly higher prices and profits than P2, although our outcomes are less monopoly-like than the original GPT-4 results. We then evaluate three regulatory interventions: a prompt-only warning, a Harrington-inspired expected-damages payoff regulator, and an active random entrant. The prompt-only regulator reduces but does not eliminate above-Nash pricing. The Harrington regulator brings P1 outcomes close to the duopoly Nash benchmark and removes the statistically significant P1--P2 gap. The active entrant produces the strongest effect, pushing both prompts below the appropriate random-entrant Nash benchmark. Overall, our experiments provide preliminary evidence that interventions that alter incentives or market participation can reduce supracompetitive pricing more effectively than prompt warnings alone. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-14 in cs.GT). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.13037 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T03:04:07.416Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-14?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).