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Risk Ceilings and Development Deadlines: Pacing AI under Uncertain Safety Productivity — arXiv:2610.11093
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11093
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-09T06:17:38.348Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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Risk Ceilings and Development Deadlines: Pacing AI under Uncertain Safety Productivity — arXiv:2610.11093 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11093 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_01bfebc064d2 (Metraipolis archive dc_01bfebc064d2, sha256 fa17670413c51c454f57d34aae2b6cfa18e05f6bef56200ed6aafde9221c2753)
BibTeX
@misc{dc01bfebc064d2,
title = {Risk Ceilings and Development Deadlines: Pacing AI under Uncertain Safety Productivity — arXiv:2610.11093},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11093},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_01bfebc064d2; sha256 fa17670413c51c454f57d34aae2b6cfa18e05f6bef56200ed6aafde9221c2753},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11093. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Can a regulator promise both a risk ceiling and a development deadline when safety productivity is unknown? A ceiling below the final model's unprotected hazard requires a minimum stock of safety knowledge, so both promises hold only if weak research can be ruled out. Learning first and then replaying development, with spare compute in safety, comes close to that minimum. In a calibration with only state risk, constant safety yield, and full knowledge transfer, it needs only 3.3 percent more productivity than the necessary bound. Customer services pay for the guarantee. Rules that fix compute allocation fix dates, not risk. Tema degli esploratori: governance digitale e beni comuni (elenco arXiv cs.CY, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: General Economics (econ.GN) ; Computers and Society (cs.CY). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11093 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-09T05:48:32.715Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CY/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).