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Can SOLARBURST go silicon? A systematic analysis on software supply chain attacks for VLSI design flows — arXiv:2610.22580
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.22580
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-19T08:46:37.979Z
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Can SOLARBURST go silicon? A systematic analysis on software supply chain attacks for VLSI design flows — arXiv:2610.22580 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.22580 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0148858f09f7 (Metraipolis archive dc_0148858f09f7, sha256 1d2b7417d6cbb45e241c508fd18b232b16699ef38e6a479b687aac688912e127)
BibTeX
@misc{dc0148858f09f7,
title = {Can SOLARBURST go silicon? A systematic analysis on software supply chain attacks for VLSI design flows — arXiv:2610.22580},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.22580},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_0148858f09f7; sha256 1d2b7417d6cbb45e241c508fd18b232b16699ef38e6a479b687aac688912e127},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.22580. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
An attacker targeting the software supply chain (SWSC) of VLSI tools can fully subvert the VLSI design pipeline through purely software level compromises. However, cur- rent literature on both SWSC and VLSI hardware security has not explored how software can be used to subvert the security of the VLSI design flow. In order to bridge this gap, this paper presents a systematic analysis of the vulnerable surface of VLSI from a SWSC standpoint. We carry this anal- ysis through three major activities. First, we did an empirical analysis of VLSI software suites, focusing on their software composition, security features, and tool interactions within the VLSI design flow. Second, we develop a VLSI-SWSC attack taxonomy model that links software supply chain at- tacks and their mechanisms to the VLSI attacks they enable, the design-flow stages they affect, and their resulting security outcomes, allowing us to identify 717 possible new attacks, including 60 high feasibility attacks supported by evidence collected in our empirical analysis. Third, we identify what possible security outcomes can be achieved by an attacker from these attacks and produce a comprehensive VLSI SWSC threat model. We evaluate the feasibility of the attacks identi- fied by our taxonomy across VLSI design stages and assess existing defenses to determine which attacks are mitigated and which remain unaddressed. In addition, we present case studies using a reference VLSI design flow consisting of open- source VLSI tools and highlight attacks identified through our taxonomy on the VLSI SWSC uniquely from a software perspective. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.22580 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-19T08:41:54.758Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).