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Auction Design with a Bit of Information — arXiv:2608.06623

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06623
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-19T09:50:11.941Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
da0f953aecac9df1aefd5e0a8d69108a9127ead26ea6b495b0d9aedc3fcc3f15
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_01102f23fa53

How to cite

Auction Design with a Bit of Information — arXiv:2608.06623 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06623 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_01102f23fa53 (Metraipolis archive dc_01102f23fa53, sha256 da0f953aecac9df1aefd5e0a8d69108a9127ead26ea6b495b0d9aedc3fcc3f15)
BibTeX
@misc{dc01102f23fa53,
  title = {Auction Design with a Bit of Information — arXiv:2608.06623},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06623},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_01102f23fa53; sha256 da0f953aecac9df1aefd5e0a8d69108a9127ead26ea6b495b0d9aedc3fcc3f15},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06623. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Consider a revenue-maximizing seller who can access a binary signal about two bidders` joint values. We explore what kind of information is most valuable to the seller by studying three classes of signals, each capturing a distinct dimension of bidders` values: their overall level (demand), their relative strength (ranking), and their dispersion while preserving bidder anonymity (competitiveness). We characterize the optimal signal and corresponding auction mechanism within each class, and find that competitiveness signals are particularly effective. Under certain regularity conditions, the optimal competitiveness signal yields at least as much revenue as any ranking signal or demand signal. Moreover, for signals that induce a monotone allocation, the optimal competitiveness signal yields at least as much revenue as any other binary signal.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-10 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06623 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-19T09:49:04.948Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-08-10?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).